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Abstract
This paper examines the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) penalties of specifically
accounting and financial related frauds. The paper analyzes whether the punishments imposed on
companies and individuals appear to be harsh enough compared to the crimes committed. The
following topics are analyzed: the SEC’s policy of “neither admit nor deny”, accountants’
suspensions, and disgorgement and civil penalties. The discussion includes information on the
SEC’s current and proposed rules and procedures regarding these topics. A small sample of data
was gathered on individuals and companies related to fraud cases from the SEC’s Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) database and the results are included in the
analysis. The fourth quarter of 2010 was chosen as the time period to begin the collection of data
after a brief examination of audit suspension periods showed that, on average, the periods ranged
from three to seven years. The eight cases that were chosen were related to the first eight releases
from the fourth quarter of 2010. The final section of the paper examines current limitations and
impediments to the SEC’s power that make successful and efficient prosecution more difficult.
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Part 1- Background Information
Fraud Defined and Background on Sample Study
The Merriam Webster dictionary defines “fraud” as a “wrongful or criminal deception
intended to result in financial or personal gain” (“Fraud”, n.d.). Fraud is one of the many forms
of “white-collar crime”, a term given to a crime that is performed by professionals and is nonviolent in nature. Although not violent, this type of crime can lead to devastating financial losses
for its victims. In addition, fraud cases are commonly complicated because they often involve a
multitude of perpetrators, the individuals have a high level of expertise and knowledge, and they
take great care in covering up any possible tracks. Fraud encompasses a wide range of different
individuals and scopes. Some examples of fraudulent crimes include credit card fraud, petty cash
fraud, healthcare fraud, identity theft, and securities fraud.

The general elements required to prove fraud in a court of law, according to the Legal
Information Institute are: a representation was made, the representation was false, the defendant
knew that the representation was false or that the defendant made the statement recklessly
without knowledge of its truth, the fraudulent misrepresentation was made with the intention that
the plaintiff would rely on it, the plaintiff did rely on the fraudulent misrepresentation, and that
the plaintiff suffered harm as a result of the fraudulent misrepresentation. (Ryan, 2009, para. 1)
A fraud case can be prosecuted criminally, civilly, or both. Whether a case is prosecuted
criminally or civilly depends on a variety of factors. One of the main differences between a
criminal and civil case is the sanctions available in each and the purpose of these sanctions. In a
criminal case, incarceration, probation, community service, and monetary fines are common
sanctions with the primary purpose of punishing the defendant for their crime (“Sanction”, n.d.).
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In a civil court case, the most common sanctions or remedies available are monetary fines,
suspending and revoking of licensures, and court orders commanding a person to do or refrain
from doing something. The primary purpose of sanctions in a civil case is to provide a penalty
for a violation of the law, while remedies are meant to provide relief to the plaintiff and are not
punitive in nature (“Sanction”, n.d.). Another major difference between choosing whether to
pursue a case in criminal or civil court is the burden of proof required in each. In a criminal case,
the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt is on the prosecution, and they must establish guilt
“beyond a reasonable doubt” whereas in a civil court case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
his case by a “preponderance of the evidence” which is a requirement that only more than
50% of the evidence points to wrongdoing (Hashmall, 2017).

This paper specifically focuses on financial and accounting related frauds, as these frauds
usually create a great magnitude of losses for victims. According to a study conducted by the
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) that examined
nearly 350 accounting fraud cases investigated by the SEC in the period from 1998-2007, “the
median fraud was $12.1 million” while “more than 30 of the fraud cases each involved
misstatements/misappropriations of $500 million or more” (McCallum, 2010, para.4). These
types of frauds are also investigated heavily by the SEC and are conveniently located in the
SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) database publicly available on
the SEC’s website. The analysis in this paper focuses solely on the civil prosecution of these
crimes because, although many of these crimes are prosecuted both criminally and civilly, the
SEC does not have the authority to prosecute in a criminal forum. The type of accounting fraud
focused on in this paper will be financial statement fraud which, according to the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners Brisbane Chapter, is the “manipulation of the information used to
3

prepare financial statements released to the public and financial institutions” (“Common
Financial Statement Frauds”, 2013, para.3). This deceit can be achieved by manipulating timing
through early recognition of revenues or postponing of expenses, or by falsifying entries through
fictitious revenues, manipulating liabilities and expenses, and valuing assets (“Common
Financial Statement Frauds”, 2013). This paper also focuses on a variety of other financial frauds
often committed on a large scale such as stock manipulation, insider trading, Ponzi schemes, and
options backdating schemes.

SEC’s Structure and Enforcement Processes

The Securities and Exchange Commission is an independent government organization that
was created with the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC was established
in response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression in which
investors lost great sums of money and confidence in securities markets. Congress created the
SEC to incorporate safety, protection, and reliability in capital markets as well as to restore
investor faith. To this day, the SEC is the primary regulator of the U.S. securities markets with
responsibilities including interpreting and enforcing federal securities laws; issuing new rules
and amending existing rules; overseeing the inspection of securities firms, brokers, investment
advisers, and ratings agencies; overseeing private regulatory organizations in the securities,
accounting, and auditing fields; and coordinating U.S. securities regulation with federal, state,
and foreign authorities. (SEC, 2013, Organization of the SEC section, para. 2)
The SEC is structured broadly and organized by both areas of functional responsibility
and by region. At the top of the organizational chart are five commissioners, one of which is
4

designated as Chairman of the Commission. Reporting to the Chairman of the Commission are
five divisions and twenty-three offices headquartered in Washington, DC and charged with
carrying out the main responsibilities of the Commission. There are also eleven regional offices
that report to the Division of Enforcement and the Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations (SEC, 2013).
This paper concentrates on the Division of Enforcement which is responsible for carrying
out the Commission’s law enforcement function. This Division of Enforcement performs the
important task of disciplining publicly traded companies and the people associated with those
entities. It also investigates any potential violations of securities laws and can bring about civil
penalties for white-collar crimes such as insider trading, accounting fraud, bribery, and others
(SEC, 2013).
The Division of Enforcement first begins its investigative process by obtaining tips,
complaints, and other forms of notices as possible evidence of a violation of securities law. This
possible evidence may come from various sources, including market surveillance activities,
investors themselves, Divisions and Offices of the SEC, other self-regulatory organizations,
securities industry sources, and media reports (SEC, 2017). These leads may turn into a
preliminary investigation formally known as a MUI, or Matter Under Inquiry, or, if the situation
is pressing enough, they may be converted directly into an investigation (SEC Division of
Enforcement, 2017).
According to the SEC Enforcement Manual, considerations the Division staff take when
evaluating whether or not to open an MUI include whether the facts underlying the MUI show
that there is potential to address conduct that violates the federal securities laws as well as
whether the assignment of a MUI to a particular office will be the best use of resources for the
5

Division as a whole (2017). During this period, assigned staff look at the potential magnitude of
the violation, losses to investors, whether conduct is ongoing, and if other authorities may be
better suited to handle the investigation. After a period of no more than 60 days, the MUI is
either converted into an investigation or closed based upon the findings (SEC Division of
Enforcement, 2017).
The MUI process is converted to a formal investigation if the Division staff believe the
investigation will have the potential to “substantively and effectively address violative conduct.”
Once converted, facts are developed through “informal inquiry, interviewing witnesses,
examining brokerage records, reviewing trading data, and other methods” (SEC Division of
Enforcement, 2017, para. 3). Witnesses may be subpoenaed in this process to furnish some of
these relevant documents to be evaluated. Formal investigations, as well as MUI’s, are carried
out privately (SEC Division of Enforcement, 2017).
After an investigation, the SEC staff present their findings to the Commission for review
along with a recommended enforcement action. The Commission can then authorize the staff to
file a case in federal court or bring about an administrative action (SEC, 2017). The decision to
either litigate in court or bring an administrative action often depends on the remedies available
in each, for example, an emergency freezing order is only allowed in federal court cases;
whereas barring a broker from securities trading is only allowed in an administrative proceeding
(Henning, 2015). Oftentimes, if the misconduct warrants it (if crime is severe enough), the
Commission will bring about both an administrative and a civil proceeding. The SEC strongly
encourages individuals and companies to cooperate, and many times the Commission and the
party charged decide to settle a matter without trial by entering into arrangements such as
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cooperation agreements, deferred, and non-prosecution agreements (SEC Division of
Enforcement, 2017).
An administrative proceeding is conducted by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who is
independent of the Commission. The ALJ considers evidence from both division staff and the
subject of the proceeding. The ALJ issues an initial decision, which includes findings of fact and
legal conclusions as well as a recommended sanction. This decision may be appealed by the
division staff or the defendant. The Commission then acts similarly to an appellate court in that it
may “affirm the decision of the ALJ, reverse the decision, or remand it for additional hearings”
(SEC, 2017, para.6). Under this forum, some of the common sanctions include “cease and desist
orders, suspension or revocation of broker-dealer and investment advisor registrations, censures,
bars from association with the securities industry, civil monetary penalties, and disgorgement”
(SEC, 2017, para.6).
In contrast to the more informal administrative proceeding, a civil action is carried out in
a U.S. District Court. The SEC files a complaint in a U.S. District Court and asks the court for a
sanction or remedy. A common sanction is an injunction, which prohibits any further acts or
practices that violate the law or Commission rules. Other common sanctions include civil
monetary penalties, disgorgement, and corporate officer and director bars (SEC, 2017).
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Sample Study from AAER Database
A sample study from the SEC’s AAER database was conducted noting the following
three variables: (1) was the policy of neither admit nor deny used, (2) where there any
accountants involved and if so, what was their punishment, and (3) were disgorgement or civil
penalties imposed on wrongdoers. The fourth quarter of 2010 was chosen as the time period to
collect the data from the AAER database after a brief examination of accountant suspensions
periods that showed that, on average, suspension periods ranged from three to seven years. The
sample study examined the first eight cases in the AAER database for the fourth quarter of 2010
that involved either accounting or financial related fraudulent wrongdoing.

The releases on the AAER database are often related to many other releases including
litigation releases, other accounting and auditing enforcement releases, and SEC complaints.
SEC complaints and litigation releases are involved if the SEC prosecuted in a civil court. The
accounting and auditing enforcement releases are related to either administrative proceedings or
civil proceedings. These releases combined, contained the information needed to examine the
three variables to discuss if fraud crimes are punished appropriately.

Release no. Defendant (s) Fraudulent wrongdoing Monetary penalties CPA Suspension
AAER3196

Michael S. Joseph

AAER3197

LocatePlus
Holdings Corp.,
Jon Latorella and
James Fields

Violated antifraud,
reporting, and
recordkeeping provisions
of the federal securities
laws, as well as auditor
independence standards
Fraudulently inflated the
company's publiclyreported revenue by
creating a fictitious
customer, falsely reporting

N/A

Permanent
Suspension
with right for
reinstatement
after 3 years

Joint and
Severable
Restitution 4.9
million

N/A
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more than $6 million in
revenue
AAER- Office Depot, Inc., Violated Regulation FD by Office Depot was
3198
former CEO
selectively communicating ordered to pay a
Stephen A.
to analysts that it would
$1 million penalty
Odland, and
not meet analysts’
and Odland and
former CFO
quarterly earnings
McKay were each
Patricia A. McKay
estimates; also,
ordered to pay
prematurely recognized
$50,000 penalties
approximately $30 million
in funds received from
vendors
AAERDelphi
Hid a $237 million
In total the
3214
Corporation, and warranty claim asserted by
executives were
former executives its former parent company
ordered to pay
Catherine
and inflated its net income
$1,284,715 in
Rozanski, J.T.
by $202 million, inflated
disgorgement and
Battenberg, III,
its cash flow from
$669,300 in civil
Alan Dawes, Paul
operations by $200
penalties
Free, John
million, engineered $270
Blahnik, Milan
million in inventory
Belans, Judith
reductions, and improperly
Kudla, Scot
reported $80 million in net
McDonald, and
income and hid up to $325
B.N. Bahadur
million in factoring

N/A

Rozanski
was
permanently
suspended
with right for
reinstatement
after 5 years
and Belans
was
permanently
suspended
with right for
reinstatement
after 3 years
N/A

AAER3215

Comverse
Technology, Inc.,
former CEO Jacob
Alexander, former
CFO David
Kreinberg, and
former Director
William Sorin

Total actual gains of
nearly $138 million from
sales of stock underlying
the exercises of backdated
options

Total
disgorgement
between the three
executives was
$51.1 million and
total civil
penalties were
$8.4 million

AAER-

Paul R. Beckwith,
former Assistant
Controller of
Theradoc, Inc.

Illegally moved $13
million out of an operating
account he managed and
transferred the money to
his account to trade stocks
on margin.
Accused of materially
inflating revenues for 14
quarters, and backdating
stock options to officers
and employees by failing
to record approximately

Ordered to pay
$178,880.74 in
disgorgement

Permanently
suspended

Vitesse was
ordered to pay a
$3 million civil
penalty, and the
total
disgorgement

Hovanec was
permanently
suspended
for the right
for
reinstatement

3216

AAER3217

Vitesse
Semiconductor
Corporation,
former CEO
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AAER3218

Louis Tomasetta,
former CFO
Eugene Hovanec,
former controller
Yatin Mody, and
former Director of
Finance Nicole
Kaplan
Alvin L. Dahl,
former CFO of
21st Century
Technologies,
Inc.’s

$184 million in
compensation expense

between the four
executives was
$3,044,184

after 10
years, and
Mody and
Kaplan were
permanently
suspended

Prepared false and
misleading Form 10-K and
two Forms 10-Q and
certified that those filings
were complete and
accurate, even though they
contained material
omissions concerning
certain reported
investments

Ordered to pay a
$5,000 civil
penalty

Permanently
suspended
with right for
reinstatement
after 12
months

Part 2- Are Fraud Crimes Punished Appropriately?
Neither Admit Nor Deny Policy
The SEC settles most of its cases with a consent judgement containing a provision known
as “neither admit nor deny”. This settlement provision allows the defendant to agree to penalties
outlined by the SEC without admitting to the SEC’s assertions of misconduct and without
denying the allegations set forth in the SEC’s complaint. This practice of “neither admit nor
deny” has been used by the SEC to settle cases since 1972. A less stringent practice allowing
defendants to settle with the SEC without admitting to the facts in the SEC complaint but not
requiring the denial provision was in effect before 1972. This less strict practice proved to be
unsatisfactory as there were cases in which companies and individuals who had settled with the
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SEC under the requirements of not admitting the allegations against them went on “public
campaigns denying that they had ever done what the SEC had accused them of doing…” (Sklar,
2012). The “nor deny” part of the provision became required in 1972 when a Rule of Practice
titled “Consent Decrees in Judicial or Administrative Proceedings” was adopted that necessitated
that a defendant “not take any action or make or permit to be made any public statement denying,
directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or creating the impression that the
complaint is without factual basis” .(Priyah, 2015, p.539)
The “neither admit nor deny” policy has undergone little criticism until nearly a decade
ago. The first case where a federal district court judge challenged the neither admit nor deny
policy was in 2011, in the case of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. This case was highly publicized because of the monetary loss to investors.
According to the SEC, “Citigroup misled investors about the independence of their investment
and failed to inform them that Citigroup stood to make millions if the product failed” (Bregant &
Robbennolt, 2013, para. 2). The case was settled by Citigroup accepting the SEC’s order to
relinquish all profits with interest from its collateralized debt obligations, pay a civil penalty, and
undergo three years of increased monitoring by the SEC (Bregant & Robbennolt, 2013). As part
of the consent decree, the neither admit nor deny policy was used. United States District Court
Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York rejected the settlement and sharply
criticized the SEC’s use of its neither admit nor deny policy. He exclaimed in his refusal that the
policy “leaves the defrauded investors substantially short-changed” and that there is an
“overriding public interest in knowing the truth” which necessitates “cold, hard, solid facts,
established either by admissions or by trials” (Bregant & Robbennolt, 2013, para. 3). This
challenge brought a wave of other criticisms by district court judges such as Judge Rudolph
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Randa of the Eastern District of Wisconsin and Judge Victor Marrero of the Southern District of
New York, along with many other prominent individuals.
The SEC and defendants who have chosen to utilize the settling practice of neither admit
nor deny have justified the practice on many different grounds. They have defended the practice
by explaining that it has been used by the SEC as a popular settling practice for decades, and that
the practice is used similarly by other federal agencies. In a statement made in 2012 by Robert
Khuzami, the then Director of the Division of Enforcement, he exclaimed that many other
federal agencies also resolve cases through negotiated settlements and consent judgments. For
example, in recent years, the EEOC resolved 80 percent of its cases and the FTC resolved 80
percent of its antitrust actions by consent judgment. The “vast majority” of civil antitrust cases
brought by the Department of Justice are resolved in this fashion. (Khuzami, 2012, para. 10)
Khuzami also points out in this statement that the SEC’s settlement policy is stricter than some
agencies because it does not allow for the denial of wrongdoing under any circumstance and has
even “remanded a retraction or correction on those occasions when a defendant’s post-settlement
statements are tantamount to a denial” (Khuzami, 2012, para. 18). Another popular defense for
the neither admit nor deny policy is that it helps the SEC settle as many cases as possible with its
limited monetary resources and faculty. The SEC claims that settling rather than going to civil
court allows its resources to be spread more appropriately across more investigations. The SEC
also notes the greater efficiency of settlement for returning funds to affected investors. Lastly,
the SEC has warned that if the neither admit nor deny policy was removed, then most defendants
would not attempt to settle cases with the SEC for fear of future litigation. The SEC stated that
“many companies likely would refuse to settle cases if they were required to affirmatively admit
unlawful conduct or facts related to that conduct” (Khuzami, 2012, para. 18). The SEC cites this
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refusal for fear of “collateral estoppel” in which a defendant could be relitigated on the same
grounds in future lawsuits.
Out of the eight fraud cases examined from the AAER database in the last quarter of
2010, all the companies and all but two of the individuals involved in these cases, utilized the
neither admit nor deny policy to settle the charges against them. This outcome is surprising based
on the severity of the fraudulent crimes committed in these cases. For example, in the case of the
SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corporation, four of the former executives were accused of
materially inflating revenues from 2001 to 2006. The former CEO and CFO were also accused of
backdating stock options to officers and employees by failing to record approximately $184
million in compensation expense from 1995 to 2006. All of the four executives involved in the
case and the company itself settled with the SEC without admitting or denying the allegations
against them (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010). Although monetary penalties
were imposed, the lack of admission by the defendants in this case and other high stakes cases
reduces the deterrent effect of wrongdoing. Settling out of court with an agreement void of any
confessions reduces a company’s potential for reputational harm and substantial monetary
damages. Settling out of court while using the neither admit nor deny policy also lessens the
transparency of the investigation. As explained by Priyah Kaul, “arguments at trial reveal and
publicize facts uncovered after thorough discovery by both parties” (Kaul, 2015, p.549). Court
hearings are often open to the public so interested or affected persons can read the judicial
opinions. The SEC settlement process by contrast, is not as transparent. The consent decree that
is decided upon by the negotiating parties is often shrouded from public sight. The only readily
available public document about the settlement is the Order Instituting Proceeding, which
contains only a small fraction of relevant facts of the trial (Kaul, 2015). Using the neither admit
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nor deny policy instead of trials on major cases such as the case of Vitesse Semiconductor
Corporation, shows that the SEC is focused on speed and efficiency rather than returning the
maximum amount of fraudulent funds to those affected investors and imposing harsh penalties
on wrongdoers. Although the SEC claims that settlement in cases allows for better use of its
resources and more investigations into other fraudulent cases, in doing so it fails to litigate the
majority of its cases to their maximum potential.
The SEC modified its neither admit nor deny policy in May of 2012 for special cases
where there is a paralleling criminal case. Under the new policy, the SEC eliminated the neither
admit nor deny language in settlements where the defendant has been convicted of the same
conduct in a criminal prosecution. This was agreed upon by members of the SEC Enforcement
Division and the Commission as a whole to ensure consistency of admissions and liability of the
defendant. This modification is not particularly relevant for the future use of the neither admit
nor deny policy because, as explained by the SEC, “it does not affect our traditional ‘neitheradmit-nor-deny’ approach in settlements that do not involve criminal convictions or admissions
of criminal law violations” (Khuzami, 2012, para.26). By only affecting a small fraction of the
cases the new policy does little to enhance transparency in the settlement process, increase the
deterrence effect of wrongdoing, or impose the maximum penalties possible to help affected
third parties.

Accountants Suspensions
Accountants play a vital role in the integrity of financial reporting. Private accountants
help businesses with internal controls and safeguards, assist them in making cost/benefit
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decisions, and keep accurate records about the company’s financial position. Public accountants
may perform various tax, audit, and other consulting services to their clients. Public accountants
that have publicly traded client companies or private accountants who work for a publicly traded
company are subject to all rules laid out by the SEC. The SEC along with stock market investors
rely heavily on accountants to perform their duties with due care and diligence. The SEC has
only so many resources that it can exert to ensure financial statements are accurate and present
fairly a company’s financial position. Therefore, the SEC must have confidence that all public
and private accountants are competent and that the auditors are independent providers. Investors
utilize financial statements to estimate their risk and return and ultimately to make informed
decision about what companies to invest in. If financial numbers are wrong or important
disclosures are not made, investors could lose a large amount of money. In addition to the loss of
money, a large financial statement error or omission because of an incompetent accountant “can
damage the Commission's processes and erode investor confidence… “(“Final Rule”, 1998,
section II, part B, para. 4). In the case that an accountant fails to perform his/her duties, whether
intentional or due to negligently, they may be reprimanded by the SEC’s enforcement division.
Rule 102(e) in the SEC’s rules of practice deals with the suspension and disbarment of
professionals. Rule 102 (e)(1) states that generally the” Commission may censure a person or
deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to
any person who is found by the Commission after notice and opportunity for hearing in the
matter…” (“Rules of Practice”, 2017). The circumstances for which the Commission may
impose these penalties include: not properly possessing the necessary qualifications to represent
others, lacking character or integrity or participating in unethical or improper professional
conduct, or willfully violating or aiding in the violation of federal securities laws or other rules
15

and regulations set forth by the SEC (“Rules of Practice”, 2017). In 1998, an amendment was
made to the Rule 102 (e). The amendment was created to clarify what was meant by “improper
professional conduct” as applied to accountants. The meaning that was clarified by the SEC is
intentional or knowing conduct, including reckless conduct, that results in a violation of
applicable professional standards; or either a single instance of highly unreasonable conduct that
results in a violation of applicable professional standards in circumstances in which an
accountant knows, or should know, that heightened scrutiny is warranted; or repeated instances
of unreasonable conduct, each resulting in a violation of applicable professional standards, that
indicate a lack of competence to practice before the Commission. (“Final Rule”, 1998, section I,
para. 4)
If a defendant is charged with violating Rule 102 (e), they may be suspended
permanently from practicing before the Commission, suspended permanently with the possibility
for reinstatement after a specified period, or temporarily suspended. The difference between a
permanent suspension with a possibility for reinstatement and a temporary suspension is that a
permanent suspension will continue to be permanent unless the respondent applies for
reinstatement whereas a temporary suspension allows the respondent to immediately begin
practicing before the commission once the suspension period has ceased. The Commission will
allow a reinstatement hearing for individuals who were suspended permanently and whose
specified period has lapsed. The individual in question may apply for reinstatement “as a
preparer or reviewer, or as a person responsible for the preparation or review, of financial
statements of a public company to be filed with the Commission” (SEC Release No. 63061,
2010, para. 1). A reinstatement will be granted “for good cause shown” which is determined on a
case by case basis and is determined solely by facts. If the defendant has submitted an
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application showing compliance with the terms of the original suspension and “no information
has come to the attention of the Commission relating to character, integrity, professional conduct
or qualifications to practice before the Commission that would be a basis for adverse action,”
then the Commission will grant reinstatement (SEC Release No. 63061, 2010, para. 5). If “good
cause” is not shown, or if an individual does not apply for reinstatement, the permanent
suspension will persist.
The data collected on the eight accounting and financial related frauds revealed eight
CPA’s charged with the violation of Rule 102 (e). All the CPA’s charged were either
permanently suspended or permanently suspended with the right to apply for reinstatement after
a certain period. Three out of the eight CPA’s were permanently suspended with no chance for
reinstatement and the other five were suspended with the chance for reinstatement after a
specified time period. This suspension period ranged between 12 months and 10 years depending
on the severity of the crime committed. Two out of the five respondents that were allowed to
apply for reinstatement after a specified time period applied for and were ultimately granted
reinstatement to practice before the Commission. One case of reinstatement examined was the
case of SEC v. Michael S. Joseph in 2006. Joseph was accused of violating “certain antifraud,
reporting, and recordkeeping provisions of the federal securities laws, as well as auditor
independence standards, while he was a partner in the national office of Ernst & Young LLP”
(SEC Release No. 63061, 2010, para.3). Joseph developed and marketed a product for one of his
E&Y clients, American International Group, Inc. and then worked with an E&Y audit team to
advise another E&Y client, PNC, on the accounting treatment on a version of that product. PNC
improperly excluded certain assets from its financial statements because of Joseph’s advice. As a
result of his violations, Joseph was permanently suspended from appearing or practicing before
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the Commission with the right to apply for reinstatement after three years. In December of 2010,
Joseph applied for reinstatement as an accountant responsible for the preparation or review of
financial statements to be filed with the SEC. Joseph was granted the reinstatement for “good
cause shown” (SEC Release No. 63061, 2010).
Investors’ and the SEC’s reliance on financial statements and on the integrity of
accountants is a strong argument for the necessity of harsh penalties on CPA’s who have violated
provisions of the federal securities laws or auditors who have violated auditor independence
standards. All accountants who have been convicted by the SEC of professional wrongdoing
should be permanently suspended with no chance for reinstatement. Imposing harsher penalties
on perpetrators have a greater deterrence effect on wrongdoing and, therefore, help to diminish
future occurrences of similar misconduct. CPA’s charged by the SEC for any type of violation
should never be able to practice before the Commission again because it may erode investor
confidence in the reliability of financial statements. The SEC’s mission is to “protect investors,
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation” (“What We Do”,
2013, para. 1). If violators are allowed to have their right to practice before the commission
reinstated, the SEC is not properly protecting investors from the risk of relying on inaccurate
financial statements. CPA’s charged with wrongdoing should not be allowed to have the right for
reinstatement to practice before the Commission to ensure they will not perpetrate any additional
acts of committing or aiding in fraud.
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Disgorgement and Civil Penalties
Public companies and individuals associated with those companies who have committed
fraudulent crimes in violation of the laws that govern the securities industry are subject to
monetary penalties imposed by the SEC. The monetary penalties imposed on these individuals or
public companies are issued in the form of either disgorgement or civil penalties. Disgorgement
as defined by the Legal Information Institute is “a remedy requiring a party who profits from
illegal or wrongful acts to give up any profits he or she made as a result of his or her illegal or
wrongful conduct” (2015). In contrast, a civil monetary penalty is defined in relevant part as any
penalty, fine, or other sanction that: (1) is for a specific amount, or has a maximum amount, as
provided by federal law; and (2) is assessed or enforced by an agency in an administrative
proceeding or by a federal court pursuant to federal law. (“Final Rule: Adjustments to Civil
Monetary Penalty Amounts”, 2001)
Disgorgement has been used by the SEC as an equitable remedy for criminal wrongdoing
since the 1970’s. The SEC was never specifically granted the right to impose disgorgement until
1990, but “the SEC and courts justified its use based on courts’ inherent ‘equity powers’”
(Liman, Solomon, & Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, 2017, para. 3). In 1990, the SEC
was authorized to seek disgorgement in administrative proceedings under the Securities
Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 (Buckberg & Dunbar, 2008). The
doctrine of disgorgement has been subject to two main arguments over the past few decades:
whether it should be solely compensative or partially punitive, and how it should be calculated.
The purpose of disgorgement has long been debated with strong arguments on each side.
The case for a purely compensative disgorgement has been made with the argument that it has
“its roots in the traditional equitable remedies of restitution and recoupment and, therefore, is not
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intended to punish the defendant” (Buckberg & Dunbar, 2008, p.350). Some district courts have
ruled on this side, finding that disgorgement has a remedial purpose and is not a “penalty or
forfeiture” (Liman et al., 2017, para. 5). On the other hand, the longstanding argument for
disgorgement as a penalty is that it is imposed, in part, as a deterrence from wrongdoing and,
therefore, should be seen as being punitive. In 2017, a landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme
Court was made that ceased any further disagreement about the purpose of disgorgement. In the
case of Kokesh v. SEC, Kokesh an investment advisor was accused of misappropriating nearly
$35 million between 1995 and 2009. The SEC took Kokesh to trial for the crime in 2014,
seeking disgorgement of the full $35 million. Kokesh argued that $30 million was
misappropriated more than 5 years before the 2014 lawsuit and, therefore, he was only
responsible for the $5 million, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2462 which “imposes a five-year statute of
limitations for any action, suit, or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty or
forfeiture” (Liman et al., 2017, para. 3). Both the District Court of New Mexico and the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in the SEC’s favor, concluding that disgorgement is not
considered a penalty and therefore is not subject to the statute of limitations.
The case was ultimately brought to the U.S. Supreme Court, where it was determined that
SEC’s disgorgement is in fact a penalty and so it is subject to the five-year statute of limitations.
The Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor, acting for a unanimous court, looked at two factors to
determine if the sanction was considered a penalty, “first, whether it redresses harm to
individuals or the public at large, and second, whether it deters conduct or compensates victims
for their loss” (Liman et al., 2017, para. 9). Considering the first factor, Justice Sotomayor found
that the SEC brings lawsuits for the government and their purpose is to “remedy harm to the
public at large” (Liman et al., 2017, para. 9). As for the second factor, Justice Sotomayor found
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that in many cases the disgorgement funds are sent to the U.S. Treasury and not directly to the
victims (Liman et al., 2017, para. 9).
As a result of the 2017 Kokesh v. SEC ruling, there will be tighter deadlines for the SEC
to seek disgorgement funds from fraud perpetrators. If a minimum of five years have passed
from the time a crime is committed to when the SEC brings about an administrative proceeding
on the issue, disgorgement is no longer allowed.
The second argument regarding how to calculate disgorgement is largely unresolved. The
disagreement to be resolved profits or proceeds theory of unjust enrichment should be used
when calculating disgorgement. The profits theory of unjust enrichment allows for the offsetting
of applicable expenses from the revenue obtained from the wrongdoing. On the other hand, the
proceeds theory disallows any offsetting of revenue illegally obtained. The allowance of
offsetting illegal profits by “direct transactional costs” and “general business expenses” has
varied greatly between district courts and has been largely determined on a case-by-case basis.
Pro-offsetting cases have been the most successful in the jurisdiction of the second
circuit. Many of these courts have held that “direct transactional costs, such as brokerage fees,
commissions, or price premiums, are valid offsets” (Kirk, 2015, p.137). The argument to reduce
illegally obtained profits by general business expenses has been more unconvincing because of
the often extensive and subjective estimates as to how they are allocated to the illegal profits.
The anti-offsetting case headed by the SEC has been made with the belief that the offsetting of
any expenses incurred in the obtainment of illegal profits should not be allowed. In the case of
SEC v. Kenton Capital, Ltd. the D.C. district courts ruled that “[defendants] may not escape
disgorgement by asserting that expenses associated with this fraud were legitimate” (Kirk, 2015,
p.137). Courts have generally held that the SEC is entitled to a disgorgement amount that is
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based on a “reasonable approximation” of illegal profits (Buckberg & Dunbar, 2008). If the
defendant believes that the disgorgement amount stated by the SEC is not reasonable then the
burden of proof is on the defendant to prove otherwise (Buckberg & Dunbar, 2008).
The Supreme court ruling on Kokesh v. SEC, deciding that disgorgement is punitive in
nature, will likely influence the calculation of disgorgement. Since disgorgement is now
considered punitive instead of compensative, courts will likely reject many offsets to
disgorgement proposed by the defendants. Allowing fewer offsets to disgorgement will increase
the amount paid by wrongdoers, therefore increasing the deterrence effect of wrongdoing.
Based on analysis of the SEC’s AAER database from the fourth quarter of 2010, five out
of the eight cases examined involved individuals who were ordered to pay disgorgement. These
five cases showed that generally disgorgement is significantly less than illegal profits obtained
from wrongdoing. For example, in the case of SEC v. Comverse Technology, the former CEO,
CFO, and directors were accused of “engaging in a decade-long fraudulent scheme to grant inthe-money options to themselves and to others by backdating stock option grants to coincide
with historically low closing prices of Comverse common stock”( “SEC Charges Former
Comverse Technology, Inc”, 2006, para. 1). The former CEO, Jacob Alexander, was found to
have actual gains of almost $138 million from sales of stock underlying the exercises of
backdated options. Alexander was charged with disgorgement of only $47.6 million for his
crime. Similarly, the former CFO, David Kreinberg, had actual gains of $13 million but was only
required to pay approximately $1.8 million in disgorgement (“SEC Settles Options Backdating
Case”, 2010).
Civil penalties are another monetary sanction that can be imposed on anyone who
violates or aids in the violation of securities laws. Unlike disgorgement, the purpose of civil
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penalty is not to disgorge profits, but instead to penalize for the wrongdoing. The civil penalty
dollar amounts per “each act or omission” of violating securities laws are outlined in penalty
statutes that contain “tiers” of violations and the maximum dollar amounts for each tier for both
individuals and entities. The tiers are ranked by specificity of wrongdoing. The first tier pertains
to any type of violation of securities law, the second tier specifies a violation that involves
“fraud, deceit, manipulation or deliberate or reckless disregard of regulatory requirement”, and
the third tier is a violation that “also involves a substantial risk of loss to others or gain to the
violator” (Eisenberg & K&L Gates LLP, 2016). The tier dollar amounts are directly related to the
tier numbers. In other words, as tiers increase, the maximum penalty amount increases. The tier
dollar amounts are changed each year to account for inflation. The most current amounts posted
by the SEC as of January 15th, 2018, range from $8,458 for individuals who have committed a
tier one violation and up to $905,353 for entities who have committed a tier 3 violation (Inflation
“Adjustments to the Civil Monetary Penalties”, 2017).
Although calculation of civil penalties is seemingly straightforward, there are still
disagreements on what is considered a separate “act or omission.” The maximum civil penalty
dollar amounts can be greatly varied if a “separate act or omission” is in one case considered to
be appropriate for each misled investor while in another case all of the conduct within the case
considered to be one “act or omission.” Most cases have been shown to use the latter choice of
calculating the maximum monetary penalty. In many cases the number of affected investors, the
number of reporting errors, or the number of misleading communications can be excessively
large and there may be concern that using these types of multipliers may violate the eighth
amendment prohibition against excessive fines; therefore, most cases have used one-to-few
multipliers when calculating maximum penalty amounts (Eisenberg & K&L Gates LLP, 2016).
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New legislation by bipartisan senate members was proposed in March of 2017 to
“increase civil and administrative monetary penalties for securities laws violations” (Congress
gov). The proposed act is aptly named “Stronger Enforcement of Civil Penalties Act of 2017”
and also proposes adding a fourth tier of civil penalties that would pertain to a person or entity
that “(1) was criminally convicted for securities fraud; or (2) became subject to a judgment or
order imposing monetary, equitable, or administrative relief in a Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) action alleging fraud” (U.S. Senate, Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
2017). The act would significantly increase the maximum penalty amounts; the act would
increase the highest possible maximum penalty amount for individuals from the existing
$181,071 per violation to $1 million and for entities from the current $905,353 to $10 million
(“Senators Introduce Bipartisan SEC Penalties Act”, 2017).
According to the sample collected from the AAER database of companies accused of
accounting and financial related frauds, fivethree of the eight cases examined involved individual
and company civil penalties. These fivethree cases showed how comparatively insignificant the
civil monetary penalties are to the dollar amount of wrongdoing. In the case of SEC v. Delphi
Corporation, numerous Delphi executives engaged in fraudulent schemes that spanned from
2000 to 2004. In fiscal year 2000, the executives hid a $237 million warranty claim asserted by
its former parent company and ultimately inflated its net income by $202 million. In 2001, the
company was accused of improperly accounting for a $20 million loan “as if it was a
nonrefundable rebate on past business, rather than a liability” in order to meet forecasted
earnings (“SEC Charges Delphi Corporation”, 2006, para. 4). The company also hid nearly $325
million in factoring of accounts receivables to materially overstate its “Street Net Liquidity”
which was a pro forma measure that was relied upon by numerous investors and analysts from
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2003 to 2004. In total, nine executives from the company were charged in the case including
prominent top executives like the company’s CEO, CFO, and controller. The civil penalties for
the individuals ranged from $16,500 to $300,000 with the total civil penalties in the case
amounting to a mere $669,300 (“SEC Charges Delphi Corporation”, 2006). For four years of
fraudulent manipulation involving hundreds of millions of dollars, the dollar amount of civil
penalties imposed is quite meager. The modest monetary punishment in this case was
reminiscent of the other four two cases examined.
Deterring fraudulent wrongdoing is the foremost reason for imposing civil penalties;
therefore, penalties should be harsh enough to accomplish this task. With current guidelines for
individual maximum monetary penalties set at $181,071 per act or omission while some
fraudulent acts involve hundreds of millions of dollars, a strong deterrence effect may not be
achievable. Allowing and encouraging harsher maximum penalties for wrongdoers whose
fraudulent acts involve big money is necessary to properly punish companies and individuals
while signaling to all that fraudulent crimes will not be taken lightly. Passage of the proposed
“Stronger Enforcement of Civil Penalties Act of 2017” would increase maximum penalties
nearly ten-fold in some cases, allowing for greater deterrence and more appropriate monetary
punishment for big money cases.

Part 3- Current Challenges and Impediments to the SEC Enforcement Process
Lack of Funding
One major issue for the SEC that seems to be an ongoing problem is the lack of resources
the Commission has in comparison to the responsibilities the agency carries. The SEC is
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appropriated a funding amount from Congress each year which the Commission relies upon to
sustain and grow its initiatives. In order to receive this funding, the SEC submits a budget
request to Congress and the President each year for the following fiscal year’s funding. In the
request, the Chairman of the Commission discusses the significant obligations of the agency
along with what the agency has achieved during the last budget period and what new priorities
are expected in the upcoming year.
The SEC is unique when it comes to its funding. The SEC’s funding is deficit neutral in
that the amount Congress appropriates to the agency does not have an impact on the nation’s
budget deficit nor does it impact the amount of funding available to other agencies. This
situation exists because the collection of fines and penalties received from various securities
transactions offset the SEC’s funding (“Testimony on the Fiscal Year 2016”, 2015). The amount
of money provided to the government from the agency exceeds that given to the agency with the
excess money allocated to the U.S. Treasury Department. Despite this budgetary neutrality, the
SEC has continuously been denied increases in funding as requested in the yearly budgetary
requests. For instance, in the yearly budgetary request for 2016, the Commission asked for 1.722
billion dollars in funding for the year but only received $1.605 billion. The Commission has been
strained for funding in recent years, and in a comparison of actual obligations versus budget
authority after 2010 shows that in four out of seven years, actual obligations exceeded budget
authority (“Budget History”, 2017).
Former Chairman of the Commission, Mary Jo White, in her budget request testimony
for fiscal year 2016, pointed out that since 2001, assets under management of SEC-registered
investment advisers increased by approximately 254 percent from $17.5 trillion to approximately
$62 trillion and the SEC’s responsibilities have also dramatically increased, adding or expanding
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jurisdiction over securities-based swaps, private fund advisers, credit rating agencies, municipal
advisors, and clearing agencies, among others. (“Testimony on the Fiscal Year 2016”, 2015,
para. 3) The SEC adopted 67 mandatory rulemaking provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Protection Act passed in 2010, established five new offices, and has issued more
than 30 studies and reports required under the new act (“Implementing the Dodd-Frank”, n.d.).
The Enforcement Division is particularly hampered with enforcing the new market rules of the
Dodd Frank Act. In 2013, one of the specific requests in the president's budget for the following
fiscal year was for additional trial attorneys. Mary Jo White criticized this request by
commenting, “we can't judge at this point how many additional trials we're going to have, but we
already don't have enough [lawyers]” (Finkle, 2013, para. 3).
Maintaining adequate resources is crucial for the SEC to pursue companies and
individuals that violate securities’ rules. The added workload of responsibilities from new
legislation like the Dodd-Frank Act, combined with the inability to hire new staff due to the
unsatisfactory budget allocation, poses an extensive limitation for the agency.

Administrative Proceedings
An additional threat to the power of the SEC has increasingly been the scrutinization of
the Commissions increased use of, and broadened authority of its administrative proceedings.
According to the agency, utilizing administrative proceedings rather than pursuing the more
formal route of a civil suit, has some notable advantages. Specifically, the procedures are more
streamlined; and, according to former Director of Enforcement, Andrew J. Ceresney,
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administrative law judges “develop expert knowledge of the securities laws, and the types of
entities, instruments, and practices that frequently appear in our cases, and the litigation period is
often much shorter and less costly than that of a civil proceeding” (Platt, n.d., p. 6).
The administrative proceedings do lack several protections and advantages that are
provided to defendants in civil courts: “there is limited discovery, the Federal Rules of Evidence
do not apply, and SEC proceedings arguably do not offer adjudication by a neutral arbiter (or a
jury)” (Halper, 2016, para. 4). These disadvantages to defendants; and the fact that the SEC has
increased its use of these administrative proceedings due to provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act
has initiated a wave of criticisms and constitutional challenges (Platt, n.d.).
As of 2015, twelve different suits have been filed by individuals facing charges in
administrative proceedings. These cases attack a multitude of different features of the
administrative proceedings process including the “use of ALJs, the comingling of prosecutorial
and adjudicative functions, the availability of monetary penalties and other sanctions, and the use
of procedures less protective than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” (Platt, n.d., p. 11).
One major constitutional challenge generated by defendants is that of Article II under the
Appointments Clause which questions the power of the SEC’s ALJ’s. Under this clause an
“Officer” must be appointed by either the president, the Senate, Courts of Law, or Department
heads (“The 2nd Article”, n.d.). The SEC ALJ’s are currently appointed by the SEC’s Office of
Administrative Law Judges so, if it was determined by the Supreme Court that ALJ’s are indeed
“Officers,” then the use of ALJ’s in administrative proceedings would be deemed
unconstitutional. Courts have often looked at the ALJ’s ability to deliver final decisions as an
indicator of the role of an “officer.” In the Lucia court, it was found that the ALJ’s decisions are
not final because the SEC commission has the power to overturn their decisions. On the contrary,
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the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bandimere v. SEC ruled that the ALJ’s were in fact
inferior officers subject to the appointments clause. This court based its decision on the ALJ’s
duties rather than their decision-making abilities (Good, Hurtado, & Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw
Pittman LLP, 2017). The future of ALJ’s is uncertain and will be most likely addressed by the
supreme court or in future legislation.
Many other complaints have been cited regarding the perceived unfairness of the
administrative proceeding process. One complaint is that there are tight deadlines imposed on
ALJ’s to issue an initial decision whereas the division investigative process is often very lengthy
in comparison. Also, discovery may be more limited for individuals being prosecuted in the
administrative forum which may hinder their ability to obtain exculpatory evidence. Another
common complaint cited is that depositions, a common part of the discovery process in civil
court, are not allowed in an administrative proceeding unless the witness will not be available to
testify at the administrative hearing (Choi & Pritchard, 2017, p. 13).
The SEC has responded to these criticisms of its unfairness to defendants in the
administrative process by revising some of its Rules of Practice. In 2016, the SEC announced the
adoption of several new amendments to its process. The amendments included extending the
prehearing period from four months to a maximum of ten months for certain cases, allowing
lengthiest trials the right to notice three depositions on each side in single-respondent cases and
five depositions per side in multi-respondent cases, and excluding evidence that is irrelevant,
immaterial, or unreliable among other changes used to clarify and conform changes to other rules
(“SEC Adopts Amendments”, 2016).
The numerous criticisms pose a great threat to the public opinion and legitimacy of the
administrative proceedings process. The criticisms of the SEC administrative process still largely
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remain, despite the reforms implemented by the commission to curb them. Many critics of the
process say the reforms do not eliminate the inherent biases of the administrative process and
still do not make an administrative action equivalent to that of a federal court action (Choi &
Pritchard, 2017). Although unable to appease all critics, the SEC has continued to address and
respond to complaints appropriately and make reforms where applicable to ensure the fairness
and accuracy of its proceedings and attempt to enhance, rather than diminish, the public’s
perception of the enforcement division. Maintaining a successful and positive reputation is also
critical to receiving the funding needed to sustain the Commission.
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